Volume 54

Issue 1

Article 2

2009

Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce
Congressional Partisanship
David G. Oedel
Allen K. Lynch
Sean E. Mulholland
Neil T. Edwards

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Election Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David G. Oedel, Allen K. Lynch, Sean E. Mulholland & Neil T. Edwards, Does the Introduction of
Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship, 54 Vill. L. Rev. 57 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

2009]

Oedel et al.: Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congres

DOES THE INTRODUCTION OF INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING
REDUCE CONGRESSIONAL PARTISANSHIP?
DAVID

SEAN E.

G.

OEDEL

1 ]

MULHOLLAND,

, ALLEN K. LYNCH,
31

&

NEIL

T.

2

1
4

EDWARDS '

ABSTRACT

In contemporary American politics, partisanship is frequently seen as excessive, even if some aspects of partisanship may fundamentally characterize the U.S. political system. To reduce partisanship in the process of
drawing political districts, some states have implemented independent redistricting commissions and related forms of depoliticized systems for redistricting. This paper analyzes whether the presence of relatively
independent redistricting also reduces partisanship in the voting behavior
of congressional representatives elected from the relevant redefined districts. Contrary to the initial expectations of the authors, the evidence
reviewed here suggests that politically independent redistricting seems to
reduce partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional delegations
from affected states in statistically significant ways. The authors conclude
with notes about the study's implications for further research into redistricting and partisanship.
I.

F

THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP

ERVENT support for one political party's policies when alternative

policies are championed by another political party-one way to define
partisanship-may be a normal, unavoidable, and perhaps even desirable
byproduct of the basic constitutional design of the American political system, with its structural divisions of governmental power and its effective
enshrinement of two political parties. Certain evidence, though, suggests
that some forms of partisanship in American political life are intensifying,'
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even during a period that has been devoid of major structural changes in
the nature of U.S. politics. 2 Recent books offer details fleshing out how
partisanship may now pose serious problems for the effective functioning
of basic American political institutions such as Congress. 3 Editorial pages
and political commentators routinely decry and denounce particular perceived examples of partisanship. 4 Eyewitness insider accounts by longtime
participants in congressional politics also suggest that partisanship is intensifying. 5 A number of other onlookers view the present state of partisanship in U.S. politics as a modern political plague inviting reform. 6 In
2. During the past fifty years, the two main parties have remained intact, as
have the major branches of government. Despite some relatively minor nods to
federalism in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the national government
continues to dominate over the state governments, and in most settings at the
national level, the executive branch continues its practical primacy over the legislative and judicial branches. That is not to say that partisanship has not affected
interactions between the congressional and executive branches of the federal government. On that narrow point, see JON R. BOND & RICHARD FLEISHER, POLARIZED
POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (2000).
3. See, e.g., JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS: How PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Hoover Studies in Politics, Econ., and
Soc'y) (2006); HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT (1996); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN
ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA, AND How TO
GET IT BACK ON TRACK (Inst. of Am. Democracy Series, 2006).
4. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, In Conference: Process Undone by Partisanship,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1997, at Al; Carl Hulse &Jeff Zeleny, PartisanAnger Stalls Congress in Final
Push, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007, at Al; Editorial, Of Bridges and Taxes, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 2007, at A6; Editorial, A Triumph for Pelosi, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2007, at
A10.
5. See, e.g., EILPERIN, supra note 3, at 121 (quoting comments of Newt Gingrich); Lee H. Hamilton, Why is Congress So Partisan?,MACON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 18,
2007, available at http://congress.indiana.edu/radio_commentaries/why-iscongress.so-partisan.php.
6. Common Cause, for instance, has adopted this policy position:
In order to make American's votes truly count in legislative and congressional elections, to create more accountability among elected officials
and to put citizens, not elected officials, in charge of who gets elected, we
must remove redistricting decisions from the purview of partisan legislators and establish fair criteria that guide the development of state and
congressional districting plans.
Common Cause, Redistricting,http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLN
K1MQIwG&b=196481 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). On the other hand, the Voting
and Democracy Research Center, which is affiliated with Fair Vote.org, endorses
proportional voting arrangements with larger multi-member districts as more
likely than independent redistricting to reduce marginalization of disfavored voter
groups within districts dominated by one party:
The lessons of our years of research on Congressional elections indicate
that resolving the gerrymandering dilemma is only part of the problem.
Redistricting reform can minimize the ability of partisan legislators to
punish their enemies and reward their friends, but for competitive elections, legislative diversity, and other public interest goals multimember
districts with proportional voting are needed to maximize the effectiveness of these reforms-and ensure all voters have choices and no strong
prospective candidate is shut out of a chance to participate.
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light of such concerns, this Article examines whether the degree of partisanship, as shown by a widely used indicator of partisanship in the voting
behavior of members of Congress, may be reduced by restricting the partisan manipulation of the redistricting process. In particular, this Article
examines the implementation of relatively politically independent redistricting systems, which have been advocated by some reformers concerned
about excessive partisanship.
A.

How This PaperFits in with Other Literature on Partisanship
and Redistricting

In the 1962 case of Baker v. Cart,7 the Supreme Court began a new era
of judicial review of redistricting, effectively overruling prior precedents. 8
Justice Frankfurter had earlier warned that such a subject would be a "political thicket" ill-suited to judicial review. 9 A steady parade of Court cases
about redistricting has proceeded to emerge from that thicket, accompanied by a rich academic literature on the subject.' 0
Justice Frankfurter's warning in 1946 about the difficulties of judicial
review of redistricting seemed, in the 1960s and 1970s, to be overly alarmist. During this time, the Court managed relatively effectively to re-introduce and supervise periodic redistricting while defining and
Voting and Democracy Research Center, RedistrictingReform Watch, http://www.fair
vote.org/?page=1389 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). An interesting discussion of the
problems of partisanship and redistricting occurred on the PBS Newshour with Jim
Lehrer among hostJim Lehrer, David Brooks, and Mark Shields. See PBS Newshour
(PBS television broadcast Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://wvww.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/politics/july-dec08/sbads/08-08.html)
(providing transcript of
broadcast).
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. See id. (finding justiciable claim, and no political question, in equal protection challenge to longstanding Tennessee-sanctioned system of non-reapportionment that, through gradual shifts in population, had led to stark
malapportionments in number of voters populating otherwise comparable districts). Although the Court in Baker v. Car purported to distinguish Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), and other cases, Justice Frankfurter in dissent noted
that a dozen "political question" cases were in sharp conflict with the holding in
Baker. Compare Baker, 369 U.S. at 202 (attempting to distinguish Colegrove), with id.
at 266-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
9. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556 (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.) ("Courts
ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is
to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample
powers of Congress.").
10. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring that federal
congressional districts be apportioned by states in order to ensure that voter populations within districts be same in size as much as practical); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (acknowledging reason for state to respect existing political
subdivisions, while nonetheless also requiring state to make "honest and good faith
effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
population as is practicable"); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (announcing
concept of "one person, one vote" as constitutional right, while striking down
Georgia's county-unit primary system).
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implementing the "one person, one vote" principle.'1 Since the 1980s,
though, the Court has repeatedly been asked to extend its supervision of
redistricting to the partisan gerrymander, a question sometimes intermingled with issues about the role of race in redistricting. 12 As the Supreme
Court in more recent years has begun to focus on whether and how claims
of partisan gerrymandering may be justiciable, Justice Frankfurter's warn13
ing seems to echo more loudly than ever.
Meanwhile, companion academic literature has become engrossed in
the difficult analytical and legal questions in understanding partisan gerrymandering. 14 Recent robust scholarship considers topics like the basic significance of partisanship in redistricting, 15 the interplay between partisan
and racial gerrymandering, 16 analysis of the judicial role in reviewing partisan gerrymanders, 17 and evaluations of procedural alternatives to redistricting that might have the effect of avoiding some of the perceived
11. See generally ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRY(Arno Press 1974) (1907) (explaining that redistricting had largely halted

MANDER

in twentieth century as entrenched interests resisted change). In the nineteenth
century, by contrast, redistricting had been common, as had political battles over
gerrymandering. See id. For an interesting discussion of gerrymandering in the
American republic until about 1842, see id.
12. The latter subject is governed by the quasi-constitutional Voting Rights
Act, as amended in 1982. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1997).
13. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
(declining to find case of constitutionally offensive partisanship in political maelstrom of Texas's mid-decade redistricting); Vieth v. Jubelier, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)
(finding by four justices that partisan gerrymandering is non-justiciable, finding by
four other justices different tests for unconstitutionally partisan gerrymanders, and
Justice Kennedy observing in middle that "workable standard" of excessive partisanship in gerrymandering had not yet but still might emerge); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986) (finding claim of partisan gerrymandering justiciable).
14. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategyfor LitigatingPartisanGerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 593 (2002). But see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes GuardingHenhouses:
The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 649 (2002) (taking issue with Professor Issacharoffs proposal).
16. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Isaacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588 (1993);
John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie:Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the
Board or Only When Used in Support of PartisanGerrymanders?, 56 U. MiAM I L. REv. 489
(2002); John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 607 (1998); John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111
HARv. L. REV. 576 (1997);J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of
Redistricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625 (1995); Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEx. L. REv.
781 (2005) (proposing decision rules for defining unconstitutionally excessive partisanship in gerrymandering); Adam Cox, PartisanFairnessand RedistrictingPolitics,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751 (2004) (arguing for imposition of limitation on mid-decennial redistricting, whether through judicial or legislative intervention).
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problems with partisan redistricting.1 8 Without venturing into the depths
of such discussion ourselves, we note that there seems to be growing suspicion that the federal judiciary may someday soon concede Justice Frankfurter's original point and withdraw from any more deep forays into the
political thicket of redistricting. The Court may, for example, decline to
seriously review claims of unconstitutionally excessive partisanship. 19
Regardless of the outcome of that important, lively discussion about
the preferable character of legal regulation and judicial review of redistricting, this Article responds to a separate set of concerns about partisanship as a general phenomenon in American political life. More
specifically, this Article explores what, if any, relationship such general evidence of political partisanship in congressional politics has with the specific instance of partisanship in the redistricting process. This issue of
partisanship in the redistricting process has more thoroughly engrossed
the current legal academic literature to date.
By electing to address the relationship between general political partisanship and specific redistricting partisanship, the authors endeavor to begin to fill a noted research gap. University of California, Berkeley
Professors Bruce Cain and Karin Mac Donald, and George Mason University Professor Michael McDonald, noted the gap in 2005.20 In his 2007
review of their work, Jonathan Steinberg affirmed the existence of a research gap. 2 1 Here is their claim:
No serious academic analyses attribute [partisan polarization in
Congress] solely or even primarily to redistricting. There are
many other plausible causes [suggesting that] the partisanship of
elected officials is not simply a function of line drawing. But is
legislative polarization even marginally affected by line drawing?
22
There has been no final verdict on that question to date.

18. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing:Deriving and Measuring Fairness in Redistricting,93 GEO. L.J. 1547 (2005); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging
Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of RedistrictingReform, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 667
(2006); Jeffrey C. Kubin, The Casefor Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REv. 837
(1997); Developments in the Law: Voting andDemocracy, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1127, 11691176 (2006) (arguing that state judicial intervention is preferable to implementation of independent redistricting commissions in efforts to reduce partisanship).
19. Such withdrawl would seem to be the implications of League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). But some commentators argue that state
judiciaries may be more likely to pursue review of excessive political partisanship.
See, e.g., Note, Toward a GreaterState Role in Election Administration, 118 HARv. L. REv.
2314 (2005).
20. See Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, From Equality
to Fairness:The Path of PoliticalReform since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 20 (Thomas E. Mann &

Bruce E. Cain, eds., 2005).
21. See Jonathan H. Steinberg, Congressional Redistricting, Served Two Ways, 6
ELEcTION L.J. 322, 323 (2007) (describing Cain et al.'s aforementioned observation of research gap as "correct[ ]").
22. Cain et al., supra note 20, at 20.
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Professor Nathaniel Persily of Columbia Law School, a prominent scholar
of redistricting, also recently touched on the issue:
Is redistricting to blame [for party polarization]? I tend to think
that the effect of redistricting on polarization has been overblown ....

At least in theory, however, such a relationship be-

tween bipartisan gerrymanders and polarization has intuitive
appeal, even if the data may not yet demonstrate that such a rela23
tionship exists.
At the outset, the authors of this Article took no position on whether
there were, or were not, significant links between the two phenomena,
and indeed were doubtful that any relationship would be found, given the
skepticism of recognized authorities such as Professors Cain, Mac Donald,
McDonald, and Persily. Moreover, after the research underlying this Article was largely complete, the authors were introduced to a draft study by
Professors Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, from
Stanford University, the University of California at San Diego, and New
York University, respectively, considering whether gerrymandering causes
polarization.2 4 They conclude, "[p]olarization is not primarily a phenomenon of how voters are sorted into districts. It is mostly the consequence
of the different ways Democrats and Republicans would represent the
same districts." 2 5 Although the McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal study
targets a different question than this Article, and its approach to analyzing
its topic also differs considerably, 26 the gist of that study's conclusion
makes the results of the study underlying this Article comparatively
intriguing.
B.

The Hypothesis That Strategic Redistricting Causes Excessive Partisanship
in Other PoliticalBehavior

Although Professors Cain, Mac Donald, and McDonald noted a
dearth of any "serious" scholarship about a possible relationship between
redistricting partisanship and general political partisanship, more than a
few well-respected political analysts have speculated openly about such a
connection. Careful observers of and participants in a complex phenomenon such as political partisanship presumably would realize that a wide
range of factors may have some bearing on such a matter. Therefore, in
the case of the phenomenon of intensifying political partisanship, it is sur23. Nathaniel Persily, Forty Years in the PoliticalThicket: JudicialReview of the Redistricting Process Since Reynolds v. Sims, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING

67, 81-82 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E.

Cain, eds., 2005).
24. See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization? (Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished draft).
25. Id.
26. For further discussion of how the McCarty et al. study differs from this
Article's study, see infra note 116.
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prising that a number of these sophisticated insiderparticipant analysts
have singled out one particular cause ahead of others: the redistricting
process. On one hand, it is easy to see an approximate correlation between the return of regular redistricting after the 1960s 27 and a roughly
simultaneous general increase in partisan rancor. 28 It is another thing,
however, to explain a particular causal dynamic that would support the
notion that the two general trends are not just coincidentally parallel.
Former Representative Lee H. Hamilton, a Democratic member of
Congress from Indiana for thirty-four years, now studies partisanship from
political retirement at Indiana University, where he directs the Center on
Congress in addition to directing the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars. In explaining why partisanship seems to be intensifying, Hamilton points to the redistricting process:
How did we get here? . . . For one thing, computers have ena-

bled state legislators-or members of Congress eager to dictate
to them-to draw congressional district lines that create safe
Democratic or Republican districts. The result is that politicians
running for the U.S. House don't have to appeal to the center to
win, they need to appeal to the core of their parties'
29
supporters.
Former Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich, considered a vigorous
partisan during his own tenure in the House, seems to join with Representative Hamilton in singling out the redistricting dynamic as a significant
cause of partisan "isolation." He notes:
[Democrats] get to rip off the public in the states where they
control and protect their incumbents, and we get to rip off the
public in the states we control and protect our incumbents, so
27. Redistricting disappeared throughout much of the United States during
the first half of the twentieth century. The Supreme Court finally entered the
festering controversy about urban voter disenfranchisement by overruling its prior
decisions in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,which held that the so-called "one man,
one vote" doctrine of legislative district voter population parity would be acknowledged as a judicially enforceable constitutional requirement. See generally GARY W.
Cox & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002).

28. See Cain et al., supra note 20, at 20 ("Party polarization in Congress and
many state legislatures has been on the rise since the 1980s, and it has reached
levels comparable to those in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."
(citing Gary C. Jacobson, Explaining the Ideological Polarization of the Congressional
Parties Since the 1970s (Apr. 15, 2004) (presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Sci. Assoc., Chicago); David Brady & Hahrie Han, An Extended

Historical View of Congressional Party Polarization (Dec. 2, 2004) (presented at
Princeton Univ.); Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized

America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. on
Inst. and Governance, Inst. of Governmental Studies, Working Paper No. 5,

2005))).
29. Hamilton, supra note 5.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: p. 57

the public gets ripped off in both circumstances ....In the long
30
run, there's a downward spiral of isolation.
Another veteran House member, Republican Jim Leach of Iowa, shared
the same basic view while in office: "[R]edistricting has made Congress a
more partisan, more polarized place. The American political system today
is structurally geared against the center .... -31

Experienced political insiders in state politics have developed impressions about the effect of partisanship in redistricting on state politics that
parallel the views of Hamilton, Gingrich, and Leach about redistricting's
effects on federal congressional partisanship. Two politically secure, second-term state governors, one a Democrat in a partly Democratic-controlled state, Governor Brad Henry of Oklahoma, and another a
Republican in a Republican-controlled state, Governor Sonny Perdue of
Georgia, have gone so far as to propose the implementation of independent redistricting commissions in their states. The governors initiated
these reforms-even though such arrangements would appear to disadvantage their parties-in order, they state, to facilitate less partisanship in
overall state politics. 32 Further, Oklahoma Governor Henry was quoted as
saying that "until we revamp our redistricting process, it will be difficult to
take the politics out of the business here at the Capitol.... [L]egislators in
'33
those safe seats don't tend to be more balanced in their approach.
Without specifically articulating a presumed connection between partisan
redistricting and party polarization, Georgia Governor Perdue still generally noted, when proposing a redistricting commission, "[y]ou can't take
politics out of politics, but an independent commission would come
closer.'34

The hypothesis that strategic partisan redistricting leads to a structure
of incentives that encourage politicians to be pushed to partisan extremes
in their representation is recited frequently as the product of an inexorable cause and effect. Politicians are not alone in suspecting a connection,
and suggesting how it may work. Washington Post reporter Juliet Eilperin,
in her popular 2006 book on partisanship, described the presumed mechanism as follows:
Now mapmakers can get detailed information about an area's political makeup-down to the voting history of a single blockand plug it into a computer, allowing them to carve up neighbor30. EILPERIN, supra note 3, at 121 (quoting Newt Gingrich).
31. Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at
63 (quoting Representative Leach).
32. SeeJanice Francis-Smith, Oklahoma Governor Henry: Redistricting Key to Creating Bipartisanship,THE JOURNAL RECORD (Okla. City, Okla.) Feb. 2, 2007; Walter C.
Jones, PartisanDrawingDecried, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Augusta, Georgia), Feb. 23,
2007, at B5.
33. Francis-Smith, supra note 32.
34. Jones, supra note 32.
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hoods with precision. The new software ensures both parties can
maximize their partisan advantage in a congressional district,
provided they have enough political clout to shepherd a map
into law ....

[T]he men and women who drew the nation's cur-

rent congressional districts made the House less accountable to
35
the public and more divided as a body.
The supposed dynamics at play can be restated in the terms of rudimentary political game theory. Strategic partisan redistricting from the
parties' perspectives is intended to maximize the impact of voters favoring
the redistricting party, and to minimize the impact of voters favoring the
other party, in situations where one party controls redistricting. From the
individual candidate's personal perspective, the principal goal is slightly
different: to maximize the chance of easy election or re-election in a particular district, while simultaneously advancing to the extent possible the
chance of the candidate's party to achieve gains and/or preserve overall
majority status.
The incentives for the redistricting players-parties and politicianscan theoretically coalesce by having the redistricting process operate to
"pack" all relevant districts (in bipartisan gerrymandering situations where
the parties agree to protect all incumbents) or at least to pack the districts
of the minority party (in partisan gerrymandering situations), thereby increasing the absolute number of safe seats whose holders are insulated
with ample margins of victory. Those safe-seat holders, the thinking goes,
may be less concerned with the awkward political job of appealing to crossparty-leaning constituents, and more concerned with appealing to the
core constituents of the district's dominant party to defend against potential challengers in a primary. This overarching, commonly touted theory
is, in shorthand, that strategic partisan and bipartisan redistricting causes
excessive partisanship in the subsequent political life of candidates for and
holders of office in the affected districts.
Although there were not many attempts until the recent draft paper
by Professors McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal to actually measure the potential relationship between partisanship and redistricting, serious scholars have at least pondered the question. For example, New York
University Law Professor Samuel Issacharoff has described the presumed
structure of incentives: "Partisan gerrymandering skews not only the positions congressmen take but also who the candidates are in the first place
....

You get more ideological candidates, the people who can arouse the

base of the party, because they don't have to worry about electability. It's
becoming harder to get things done .... -36 Rutgers University Professors
Alan Tarr and Robert Williams make similar general claims: "Safe seats
mean that legislators do not have to seek the political middle, because
EILPERIN, supra note 3, at 92-93.
36. Toobin, supra note 31 (quoting Professor Issacharoff).

35.
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their electoral prospects do not depend for support from independent
37
voters and members of the opposing party."
Distinct possibilities exist that even brazenly partisan redistricting
strategies can be more complex than any simple "packing" approach,3 8
that there are many other complex structures of incentives facing both
parties in their redistricting decisions and politicians in their voting behaviors,3 9 and that "independent" redistricting processes may not be very in-

dependent of partisan considerations. 4 ) Despite these possibilities, this
Article, for the sake of argument, accepts at face value the hypothesis that
partisan redistricting may foster partisanship in the behaviors of congressional representatives. The point here is simply to test the strength of the
supposed connection in an inverse situation.
II.

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING AS A PROPOSED ANTIDOTE

TO PARTISANSHIP

In short, if politicized methods of redistricting exacerbate partisanship in broader political contexts, then it is possible that depoliticizing the
methods of redistricting may reduce broader examples of partisanship.
This proposition is a common companion of the basic underlying hypothesis that strategic redistricting causes partisanship. Former Representative
Hamilton, for example, has joined the reform movement advocating that
a plausible antidote to excessive partisanship may be, at least in part, to
wrest control of the redistricting process from the political parties: "Perhaps [change reducing congressional partisanship will come from] a move
in some states to abandon partisan redistricting and move to some more
neutral way of drawing lines ....

[E]ven little moves in the right direction

would be an improvement over the situation as it stands today." 4 1 This
paper attempts to test whether depoliticization of the redistricting process
can in fact produce reductions in generally excessive partisanship, as Representative Hamilton has surmised. Does abandonment of a more partisan form of redistricting ultimately result in even a little reduction in
partisanship behavior by congressional representatives elected to re37. G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Eighteenth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law: Introduction,37 RUTGERS L.J. 877, 878 (2006).
38. See generally STEvE BIcKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007).
39. See Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America:
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. on Inst. and
Governance, Inst. of Governmental Studies, Working Paper No. 5, 2005) (suggesting, among other things, that party affiliation and discipline may explain more

about voting behavior of politicians than circumstances of district boundaries and
constituency characteristics); see also McCARTY, POOLE, & ROSENTHAL, supra note 1.
40. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REv.

1029, 1030 (2001) (recounting anecdotal comment by member of Colorado's commission that commission had reduced politics in redistricting from 100 to 98
percent).
41. Hamilton, supra note 5.
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present districts that are drawn through relatively depoliticized redistricting processes?
Incidentally, the authors readily acknowledge that there may well be
ways of reducing raw party opportunism in redistricting, other than
through the utilization of relatively depoliticized independent redistricting commissions, advisory panels, panels of judges, or the like. Professor
Issacharoff, for instance, has proposed a categorical, constitutionally
based, and judicially enforced proscription against any partisanship in redistricting, whatever the vehicle. 42 Emory Law Professor Kang, on the
other hand, in his Washington University Law Review article, has proposed
more direct democratic involvement by the voting public in picking
among alternative redistricting plans, reasoning that transparency of and
public involvement in the process would improve the quality of what is
inevitably an inherently political result. 43 By studying the effects of relatively independent redistricting commissions, the authors of this Article
do not mean to endorse any particular device for depoliticizing redistricting, or even to discount Professor Kang's conceptually different and transparently politicized approach to reducing raw partisanship in the crafting
of political districts.
Going further, the authors recognize that the whole premise that partisanship is a "harm," whether in the particular case of redistricting or in
the more general case of representative voting behavior, may be mistaken
if partisanship is re-conceptualized. One can imagine a defense of partisanship as enhancing the distinctiveness of electoral options, sharpening
the outlines of policies, providing a potential platform for a third party to
challenge the amazingly resilient system of political party duopoly, or fairly
expressing the will of a fundamentally polarized electorate. 44 One can
even imagine partisanship just as an expression of the "truth" that one
partisan approach is right in some absolute sense, and another approach
42. See Issacharoff, supranote 15, at 647-48 (advocating eliminating control of
redistricting by partisan officials). But see Persily, supra note 15, at 650 (2002) (taking issue with Professor Issacharoff's proposal).
43. See Kang, supranote 18, at 668-69 (proposing requirement of democratic
approval for redistricting plans).

44. See Bill Bishop, The Schism in U.S. PoliticsBegins at Home, AUSTIN AMERICANApr. 4, 2004, at Al (noting that American public is evenly split politically at national, but not local level). The Austin American-Statesman conducted an
interesting survey of historical voting patterns demonstrating that "[t]oday, most
Americans live in communities that are becoming more politically homogenous
and, in effect, diminish dissenting views. And that grouping of like-minded people
is feeding the nation's increasingly rancorous and partisan politics." See id. (observing occurrence of political polarization at community level); see also Aaron B.
Wildavsky, ChoosingPreferences by ConstructingInstitutions, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 3, 8
(1987) (describing hypothesis that social relationships provide foundation for political preferences). From a theoretical perspective, Professor Wildavsky has proposed a cultural explanation for how members of the public, largely disengaged
from the details of complex political policies, can nevertheless generate clear preferences about those policies. See Wildavsky, supra, at 8.
STATESMAN,
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wrong, to an extent that justifies incidental ill effects from insistence on
the "right" principle. 4 5 Such discussions, however, are for another day.
A.

The Types of Redistricting Processes

Ryan Bates, in his Duke Law Journal Note, has already ventured a
rough outline of the different types of independent redistricting systems
practiced by several states. 46 In short, Bates proposes a typology of "primary" commissions that have presumptive authority for redistricting,
"backup" commissions that come into play only when the legislature
reaches a stalemate or otherwise defers to the commission, and "advisory"
commissions that participate at an early stage by offering a nonbinding
plan, leaving the final decision in the legislature's hands. 47 The Bates typology is further refined by accounting for variations in the commissions'
45. See Tom DeLay, Farewell Address (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/tomdelayhousefarewell.htm (defending role of
partisanship in political process). This last argument was unabashedly articulated
by former House Speaker Tom DeLay from the well of the House as he retired
under pressure of a criminal indictment, asserting his own involvement in illegal
political maneuvers in the alleged pursuit of partisan gain:
You show me a nation without partisanship, and I'll show you a tyranny.
For all its faults, it is partisanship, based on core principles, that clarifies
our debates, that prevents one party from straying too far from the mainstream, and that constantly refreshes our politics with new ideas and new
leaders. Indeed, whatever role partisanship may have played in my own
retirement today or in the unfriendliness heaped upon other leaders in
other times, Republican or Democrat, however unjust, all we can say is
that partisanship is the worst means of settling fundamental political differences-except for all the others.
Now, politics demands compromise. And Mr. Speaker, and-and
even the most partisan among us have to understand that. But we must
never forget that compromise and bipartisanship are means, not ends,
and are properly employed only in the service of higher principles. It is
not the principled partisan, however obnoxious he may seem to his opponents, who degrades our public debate, but the preening, self-styled
statesman who elevates compromise to a first principle. For the true
statesman, Mr. Speaker, we are not defined by what they compromise, but
[by] what they don't. Conservatives, especially less enamored of government's lust for growth, must remember that our principles must always
drive our agenda and not the other way around.
Id.

DeLay's defense of partisanship from the right as a matter of principle is
matched by New York Times columnist Paul Krugman's defense of partisanship from
the left, also on grounds of principle:
[A candidate can't] transcend partisanship in an age when that's neither
We all wish that American politics weren't so
possible nor desirable ....
bitter and partisan. But if you try to find common ground where none
exists-which is the case for many issues today-you end up being played
for a fool.
Paul Krugman, Played for a Sucker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A33.
46. See Ryan P. Bates, Note, CongressionalAuthority to Require State Adoption of
Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DuKE L.J. 333, 347-51 (2005).
47. See id. at 34748.
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membership structure. Bates notes that commission membership can vary
in terms of the bipartisanship of membership, the extent of "blue-ribbon"
membership defined by other, often political, positions held, and whether
a deadlocked bipartisan panel has a tie-breaking member from outside the
48
immediate political arena.

A survey of the redistricting systems of fifty states conducted during
2006 and 2007 at Mercer University Law School by Professor David Oedel,
referred to as "the Mercer Study," confirms Bates's general typology and
supplements it by considering the redistricting systems in the states that do
not have independent or semi-independent redistricting systems. The
Mercer Study finds that several states have adopted relatively independent
redistricting commissions, that a variety of other techniques exist to address partisan logjams in redistricting, and that the largest group of states
still treats the redistricting process as inherently political, to be worked out
either at the discretion of any party effectively controlling the process, or
in bipartisan ways when different parties control different houses of the
state legislatures and/or the governor's office. 49 The Mercer Study is the
basis for a very rough ranking of redistricting approaches across the country in terms of their relative partisan depoliticization or politicization, as
outlined below.
B.

Results of the Mercer Study of Redistricting Systems (2006-2007): Degrees of
Politicization in the Various Types of US. RedistrictingSystems
(Relatively De-Politicized Systems Ranked First)

1. Category 1: States with primary, binding, and independent redistricting commissions, whose memberships include a non-political tiebreaker.
States included in Category 1 have a primary, binding, and independent redistricting commission. The membership is designed to draw an
equal number of members from the two major parties, but the membership is uneven due to an ostensibly independent chairman or "tie-breaking" member. The legislature must accept the redistricting plan of the
commission and the governor has no veto power. The commission draws
both the state legislative districts and the U.S. congressional districts.

48. See id. at 349-51. Iowa's system of an agency conducting the redistricting
function is described as unique, and outside of Bates's typology. See id. at 349.
49. See David Oedel, Mercer Study (2007) (unpublished, on file with Mercer
University Law School Furman Smith Law Library). The study was undertaken to
support the work of a blue-ribbon task force on Georgia redistricting reform appointed by Governor Sonny Perdue.
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New Jersey, 52 and

Washington.
2. Category 2: States with fully independent redistricting commissions
for state legislative districting, but due to small populations, whose federal
congressional districts are at large (i.e., permitted just one congressional
representative).
Category 2 states have a primary, binding independent redistricting
commission. The membership is designed to draw an equal number of
members from the two major parties, but the membership is uneven due
to an ostensibly independent chairman or "tie-breaking" member. The
legislature must accept the redistricting plan of the commission and the
governor has no veto power. The commission draws the state legislative
districts, but there is no power delegated to such commissions for the
drawing of federal congressional districts because the state has only one
50. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § I (establishing independent redistricting
commission for U.S. congressional and state legislative districts consisting of five
members, of which no more than two will be from same political party, and prohibiting members from seeking elected office within three years of membership); see
also Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Proposition 106, http://
www.azredistricting.org/?page=prop106 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing text
of Proposition 106, which amended Arizona Constitution redistricting procedure).
51. See HAw. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 2, 9 (requiring state reapportionment commission-comprised of eight members selected by state legislative leaders from each
of Hawaii's major parties, and chairman selected by eight appointed members-to
establish U.S. congressional district lines by majority vote, which will become law
upon publication by chief election officer, and further providing that commission
members are restricted from seeking elective office for first two election cycles
following redistricting); see also State of Hawaii Office of Elections, Factsheet Reapportionment, http://www.hawaii.gov/elections/factsheets/fsbol41.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (detailing information and procedures on reapportionment).
52. See NJ. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing New Jersey Redistricting Commission to establish congressional districts after each federal census, and providing
that commission is to consist of eight members appointed by two major party leaders of state house and senate, four members selected by chairmen of state committees of two major political parties, and one chairman, who shall not have held
public office in last five years, selected by appointed members); see also NewJersey
Legislature-Constitution, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/lawsconstitution/consearch.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing full text of New Jersey
Constitution).
53. See WASH. CONsT. art. II, § 43 (establishing authority of commission to
provide for state legislative and U.S. congressional districts in each year ending in
one; requiring commission to be comprised of four members appointed by legislative leaders of each of two major political parties, and fifth non-voting member
selected by initially appointed members, though redistricting plan requires approval of only three members; providing that elected officials are not eligible for
memberships, and districts may not be drawn purposely to favor or discriminate
against any party or group; requiring that plan be approved by January 1st of each
year ending in two, or state supreme court shall adopt independent plan; and
stating that plan may be amended only by vote of two-thirds of legislature); see also
Washington State Redistricting Commission, http://www.redistricting.wa.gov (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing media information on redistricting efforts).
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congressional district. States in this category include Alaska, 54 Delaware
55 and Montana. 56
(Blue-Ribbon),
3. Category 3: States with primary, binding, and bipartisan redistricting commissions, but with no nonpolitical tie-breaking member.
States falling into Category 3 have a primary, binding, and independent redistricting commission. The membership is designed to draw an
equal number of members from the two major parties. There is no independent chairman or "tie-breaking" member, potentially resulting in
deadlock. The legislature must accept the redistricting plan and the governor has no veto power. The commission draws both the state legislative
and federal congressional districts. This category is comprised of the
states of Idaho, 57 Michigan (as to state districts) ,58 and Missouri (as to
54. See ALAsKA CONST. art. VI, § 8 (establishing five-member redistricting
board of non-public employees appointed in year in which federal census is taken;
providing that board is comprised of two appointees of governor and one appointee of each of state senate president, state speaker of house, and chiefjustice
of state supreme court; and stating that board is responsible for drawing state
house and senate districts); see also About Redistricting, http://www.state.ak.us/
redistricting/aarticlevi.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing Alaskan constitutional provisions on legislative apportionment).
55. See DEL. CONsT. art. II, § 2A (following federal census, state house and
senate districts are drawn by commission consisting of governor, as chairman, and
state chairmen of two major political parties, and shall be drawn with concern for
equal population, natural and ancient boundaries, contiguous territory, and without favor to any party).
56. See MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14 (establishing commission of five members,
none of whom are public officials, to be selected for purposes of drawing state
house and senate districts, and U.S. congressional districts when necessary; providing that majority and minority leaders of house and senate each appoint one member, and appointed members select chairman; and stating that plan shall be
submitted ninety days after federal census data is available to secretary of state, and
it shall become law); see also Final Legislative Redistricting Plan, http://leg.mt.gov/
content/committees/interim/2001.2002/distapport/2000rpt sos.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (giving details of redistricting plan).
57. See IDAHO CONsT. art. III, § 2 (providing that commission for reapportionment is to be formed by order of secretary of state where there is reason to reapportion state legislature or new U.S. congressional district boundaries, and stating
that commission is comprised of six members: four of which are designated by
leaders of two major political parties in state house and senate, and two of which
are designated by state party chairmen of two major political parties, but no members may be elected officials or run for elected office five years after serving on
commission).
58. See MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (establishing commission on legislative apportionment for purposes of apportioning and creating districts for state house
and state senate only; requiring that apportionment be done with regard to state
constitutional requirements; and providing that eight members are selected evenly
by party leaders of state house and senate, and chairmen of state parties, who shall
be restricted from public office for two years after apportionment is effective); see
also 2007 Senate Joint Resolution A, http://www.michiganvotes.org/2007-SJR-A
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (describing resolution to create bipartisan redistricting
commission).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAWA REVIEW

[Vol. 54: p. 57

59
state districts).

4. Category 4: States with primary, binding, and semi-independent
redistricting commissions whose blue-ribbon members have separate political roles as well.
The states in Category 4 have a primary, binding redistricting commission. The commission membership is "blue ribbon" in the sense that
members are selected on the basis of their other official roles in government, usually political in nature, which often has the effect of weighting
the membership in favor of one of the two major parties. The legislature
must accept the redistricting plan and the governor has no veto power.
The commission draws both the state legislative and federal congressional
districts. The two states in this category are Arkansas (as to state legislative
61
districts) 60 and Ohio (as to state legislative districts).
5. Category 5: States with no independent redistricting commission,
but a court is empowered to redistrict after a redistricting deadline passes.
Category 5 states vest redistricting authority in the legislature. If the
legislature is unable to enact a legally compliant redistricting plan by a
statutory or reasonable deadline, however, the courts will intervene to enact a binding redistricting plan. The states in this category include Ala-

59. See Mo. CONST. art. III, § 2 (establishing committee consisting of one
member from each party in each of Missouri's U.S. congressional districts to draw
plan for districts of state house of representatives, and providing that members are
disqualified from public office for four years after participation); Mo. CONST. art.
III, § 7 (establishing commission of ten members, evenly divided among two major
parties, appointed by governor from list of nominees provided by state party chairmen for purpose of drawing state senate districts, and requiring members to be
disqualified from public office for four years after participation); see also FairVote Missouri, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=315 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (noting
that Congressional districts are drawn by state legislature).
60. See ARK. CoNsT. art. VIII (establishing Board of Apportionment consisting

of governor, secretary of state, and attorney general to apportion districts for state
house and senate); see also Arkansas Board of Apportionment, http://www.
state.ar.us/arkdistrict/legal.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (describing history of
Arkansas Board of Apportionment). Congressional districts are drawn by the state
legislature.
61. See OHIO CoNsT. art. XI, § 1 (granting authority to governor, auditor of
state, secretary of state, and two persons chosen by leaders of each party of state
house and senate to apportion districts of state general assembly); see also Constitution Online, http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/constitution.cfm?Part=I 1&Section=01 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing reapportionment provision of state
constitution). Congressional districts are drawn by the state legislature.
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bama, 6 2 California, 63 Connecticut, 6 4 Florida, 65 Iowa (as to state legislative
districts), 66 Louisiana (as to state legislative districts), 67 Maine, 6 8 Minne-

62. SeeALA. CONST. art. IX, § 198 (providing that redistricting is initial responsibility of Alabama state legislature); Brooks v. Hobbie, 631 So. 2d 883, 889-90 (Ala.
1993) (holding that following legislative failure to redistrict U.S. congressional districts, court has authority to adopt redistricting plan); see also Welcome to the Alabama State Legislature, http://www.legislature.state.al.us/reapportionment/
reap.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing materials from state's committee
on reapportionment and redistricting).
63. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, §§ 1-2 (authorizing state legislature to create
U.S. congressional districts with limitations in regard to single-member districts,
reasonable population equality, contiguity, and geographical integrity); Wilson v.
Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 547 (Cal. 1992) (finding that California Supreme Court has
authority to amend and adopt redistricting plan if legislature is unable to approve
plan in time for upcoming election); see also Statewide Database, http://
swdb.berkeley.edu/about.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (establishing online redistricting database for California).
64. See CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6, amended by CONN. CONsT. art. XII, art. XVI,
§ 2, art. XXVI, and art. XXX, § 2 (providing authority for Connecticut legislature
to create U.S. congressional districts; requiring two-thirds vote of each house for
passage of redistricting plan; and stating that legislative failure to adopt plan will
result in formation of nine-member bipartisan binding independent redistricting
commission, and failure of that commission to agree on plan allows Connecticut
Supreme Court to intervene and compel commission to enact plan or otherwise
establish redistricting plan); see also CT Constitution, Article 3, Section 6, http://
www.cga.ct.gov/red/section6article3.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (discussing reapportionment procedure).
65. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16 (granting apportionment powers to state legislature, providing for special apportionment session in event that legislature is
unable to adopt plan at adjournment of general session, and allowing Florida Supreme Court to order redistricting plan in event that special apportionment session does not yield statutorily compliant plan); see also House Redistricting
Committee, http://www.floridaredistricting.org/ConstRequirements.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing state constitution's provisions concerning
apportionment).
66. See IowA CONST. art. III, § 36 (granting Iowa Supreme Court authority to
review apportionment plans of Iowa General Assembly, and order compliant plan
be enacted or otherwise cause plan to be enacted); see also Iowa Redistricting Profile, http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Redist/profile.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
(outlining redistricting information).
67. See LA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (granting Louisiana Supreme Court authority
to establish districts for state house and senate in event legislature fails to produce
compliant redistricting plan by end of year following year of report of federal decennial census); see also FAQ's-Redistricting Louisiana, http://house.legis.state.la.
us/hredist/redist-faq.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (answering frequently asked
questions about redistricting).
68. See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3 (granting Maine Supreme Court authority
to enact apportionment plan for Maine's U.S. congressional districts upon failure
of Maine legislature to agree on plan within 130 calendar days after convening); see
also FairVote-Maine, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=309 (last visited Feb. 17,
2009) (summarizing information and issues on redistricting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: p. 57

sota, 6 9 New Hampshire, 70 and South Dakota (inapplicable to U.S. con71
gressional district, which is at large).
6.

Category 6: States with semi-independent "back-up" redistricting

commissions with a tie-breaking member.
Category 6 states have a binding independent redistricting commission. The membership is designed to draw an equal number of members
from the two major parties, but the membership is uneven due to an ostensibly independent chairman or "tie-breaking" member. The commission is not active until the state legislature fails to enact a legally compliant
plan by a statutorily imposed deadline. States falling into this category are
73
72
and Indiana (as to U.S. congressional districts only).
Illinois
7. Category 7: States with semi-independent "blue-ribbon" back-up
redistricting commissions.
69. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (granting authority to Minnesota legislature
to establish redistricting plan for U.S. congressional districts); Zachman v.
Kiffmeyer, 629 N.W.2d 98, 98 (Minn. 2001) (recognizing judicial authority to establish redistricting plan where legislature is unable to adopt plan in reasonable
time before election); see also MN Legislature-MN Redistricting Profile, http://
www.gis.leg.mn/html/red-prof.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (listing references
and information about redistricting).
70. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. IX (establishing initial authority in legislature to
create apportionment plan); In re Below, 855 A.2d 459, 462-63 (N.H. 2004) (authorizing New Hampshire Supreme Court to perform redistricting where legislature fails to do so before election); see also Fair Vote-New Hampshire, http://
www.fairvote.org/?page=319 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (summarizing background
and other issues concerning redistricting).
71. See S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5 (granting authority of South Dakota legislature
to reapportion state into districts that are compact, contiguous, and as equally
populated as practicable, but requiring that where legislature is unable to do so by
statutory deadline, Supreme Court is responsible for apportionment); see also
FairVote-South Dakota, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=331 (last visited Feb. 17,
2009) (presenting background information about redistricting).
72. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (establishing initial authority to create U.S.
congressional districts in Illinois General Assembly, and requiring that district be
compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population; further providing that
if Illinois General Assembly is unable to approve redistricting plan by statutory
deadline, eight member commission comprised of both state representatives and
unelected persons appointed by leaders of two major parties of Illinois General
Assembly shall file redistricting plan upon approval of five members; and stating
that deadlock by commission past statutory deadline will be resolved by random
selection by secretary of state of additional tie-breaking member from two names
submitted by Supreme Court); see also Illinois Constitution-Article 4, http://www.
ilga.gov/commission/lrb/con4.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing state
constitution's redistricting provisisions).
73. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2002) (authorizing commission
consisting of speaker of house, president pro tempore of senate, chairman of senate and house committees responsible for redistricting, and fifth member appointed by governor from membership of general assembly to adopt redistricting
plan upon failure of general assembly to do so); see also Indiana Code 3-3-2, http://
www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title3/ar3/ch2.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
(containing redistricting provisions).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss1/2

18

2009]

Oedel et al.: Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congres
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING

The states of Category 7 have a binding redistricting commission
whose "blue ribbon" membership is selected on the basis of the members'
other roles, usually political in nature, and so are likely to be weighted in
favor of one of the major parties. The commission is not active until the
state legislature fails to enact a legally compliant plan by a statutorily imposed deadline. The legislature must accept the redistricting plan and the
governor has no veto power. Category 7 states are Mississippi (as to state
legislative districts), 7 4 Oklahoma (as to state legislative districts), 75 and
7 6
Texas (as to state legislative districts) .
8. Category 8: States with semi-independent advisory redistricting
commissions.
The members of Category 8 have an independent redistricting commission, but the redistricting plan is a proposal to the legislature rather
than a binding plan. The legislature may amend the proposal or reject
the proposal and enact a new plan. States in this category include Colorado (as to state legislative districts), 77 Iowa (as to U.S. congressional districts only), 78 and Vermont (inapplicable to U.S. congressional district,
79
which is at large).
74. See Miss. CONsT. art. 13, § 254 (directing creation of apportionment commission consisting of speaker of house, president pro tempore of senate, attorney
general, secretary of state, and chief justice of supreme court, following failure of
legislature to reach apportionment resolution); see also Article 13, Section 254Senatorial and Representative Districts, http://www.mscode.com/msconst/13/13254.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing apportionment provision of state
constitution).
75. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 9A, 10A, IIA; see also Section V-I1A, http://
www2.lsb.state.ok.us/oc/oc-5-11A.rtf (last visited on Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining
that apportionment commission consists of state attorney general, Superintendent
of Public Instruction, and state treasurer, should legislative reapportionment fail).
76. See TEx. CONST. art. III, § 28 (creating, upon failure of legislative redistricting, legislative redistricting board consisting of Commissioner of General Land
Office, Comptroller of Public Accounts, lieutenant governor, speaker of house,
and attorney general); see also Redistricting Process-Legislative Redistricting
Board, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/process_lrb.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2009) (explaining process and purpose of legislative redistricting board).
77. See COLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 48 (establishing eleven-member reapportionment commission charged with creating reapportionment plan that will be submitted to Colorado Supreme Court for approval); see also Colorado Redistricting and
Reapportioning, http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/legdir/lcsstaff/REAP/Constitution.htm#State (last visited on Feb. 17, 2009) (listing relevant sections of statute).
78. See IowA CODE §§ 42.5-42.6 (2006) (establishing five-member temporary
advisory commission, Legislative Services Agency, to aid and assist legislature in
drawing U.S. congressional districts that are statutorily complaint, and creating
duty to present redistricting plans to general assembly for approval and to Iowa
public for comment); see Iowa Redistricting Profile, http://www.legis.state.ia.us/
Redist/profile.pdf (last visited on Feb. 17, 2009) (outlining information on
redistricting).
79. See VT. CONST. ch. II, § 73 (authorizing general assembly to provide for
establishment of legislative reapportionment board to advise and assist general assembly); see also Report of the Legislative Apportionment Board: The 2001 Tentative Plan for the Vermont Senate, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/02
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9. Category 9: States with exclusive legislative responsibility for redistricting, but the task is assigned to a legislative committee.
States under Category 9 vest redistricting authority in the legislature.
The legislature assigns redistricting duties to a specialized committee, but
retains the right to accept or reject the recommendation subject to gubernatorial veto. Category 9 states include Georgia,8 0 Kansas, 8 1 Kentucky, 82
Louisiana (as to U.S. congressional districts), 8 Michigan (as to U.S. congressional districts),84 Mississippi (as to U.S. congressional districts),85
North Carolina, 86 North Dakota (inapplicable to U.S. congressional seat,

Redistricting/LABSenate.pdf (last visited on Feb. 17, 2009) (summarizing history
and plan of apportionment).
80. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-1-2 (Supp. 2007) (implying Georgia legislature's
basic constitutional authority to apportion congressional districts); see also Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment Committee, http://www.legis.ga.gov/
legis/2005_06/house/Committees/reapportionment/gahlcr.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2009) (providing overview of reapportionment committee).
81. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-138 to -142 (Supp. 2004) (establishing current
U.S. congressional districts for Kansas); see also Kansas Legislative Research Department-Redistricting-Home,
http://skyways.lib.ks.us/ksleg/KLRD/Redistrct/
redistr.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
(providing Kansas redistricting
information).
82. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118B.100-.160 (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing
authority of Kentucky legislature to draw U.S. congressional districts for Commonwealth of Kentucky and establishing current districts); see also Fair Vote, Kentucky
Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=307 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
(providing redistricting information for Commonwealth of Kentucky).
83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1276 (2004) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for Louisiana); see also Louisiana House 2001 Redistricting Information Frequently Asked Questions, http://house.legis.state.la.us/hredist/
redist-faq.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for
Louisiana).
84. See MICH. CoMP. LAws SERV. § 3.63 (LexisNexis 2003) (authorizing legislature to establish U.S. congressional districts that must, among other things, be
single-member districts, contiguous, compact, regularly numbered, compliant with
federal statues, and split county and city lines as infrequently as possible); see also
Fair Vote, Michigan Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=312 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Michigan).
85. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 5-3-121 (2002) (establishing standing joint congressional redistricting committee assigned to adjust U.S. congressional districts if
number of districts is altered as result of federal census); see also The Mississippi
Standing Joint Reapportionment Committee, http://www.msjrc.state.ms.us/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Mississippi).
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-201 (2003) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for North Carolina); see also North Carolina General AssemblyNCGA-Redistricting
Concepts, http://www.ncleg.net/GIS/RandR07/Overview.html?member= (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing background on North
Carolina redistricting).
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which is at large) ,87 New Mexico,8 8 Nevada,8 9 New York,9 0 Oregon, 9 1 Ten95
94
93
nessee,9 2 Texas (as to U.S. congressional districts), Utah, Virginia,
87. See Fair Vote, North Dakota Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/
?page=324 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for
North Dakota). North Dakota has a single representative, and thus, has no statutory policy regarding the establishment of U.S. congressional districts. See id.
88. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-15 (West Supp. 2006), invalidated byjepsen v.
Vigil-Giron, No. D-0101-CV- 2001-02177 (N.M. FirstJud. Dist. Ct. 2002), available at
http://swdb.berkeley.edu/News-Info/News-Info/CourtCases/NM/Jepsen-vVigil-Giron.pdf (establishing authority of New Mexico legislature to draw
U.S. congressional districts for State of New Mexico). Although the plan enacted
by this statute was eventually altered due to constitutional challenges, another plan
was adopted. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-15.1 (West Supp. 2006) (delineating composition of New Mexico congressional districts); see also Fair Vote, New Mexico
Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=321 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
(providing redistricting information for New Mexico).
89. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.060-.120 (LexisNexis 2002) (providing redistricting information for Nevada); Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau District
Information, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/RedistReapp.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (same); see also Fair Vote, Nevada Redistricting 2000, http://
www.fairvote.org/?page=318 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (same).
90. See N.Y. STATE LAw § 110 (McKinney 2003) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for New York); see also The New York Legislative Task Force on
Demographic Research and Reapportionment, http://latfor.state.ny.us/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for New York).
91. See OR. REv. STAT. § 188.010 (2005) (establishing that Oregon legislature
has authority to draw U.S. congressional districts, and must be, as much as is practicable, contiguous, equal in population, related to geographic and political boundaries, related to communities of common interest, and connected by
transportation links; further providing that districts must not be drawn for purpose
of favoring any political party, incumbent legislator, or diluting voting strength of
any language or ethnic minority group); see also Fair Vote, Oregon Redistricting
2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=327 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing
redistricting information for Oregon).
92. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-102 (2003) (granting authority to Tennessee
General Assembly to establish U.S. congressional districts subsequent to each federal census); see also Fair Vote, Tennessee Redistricting 2000, http://
www.fairvote.org/?page=332 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Tennessee).
93. See TEX. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 197i (Vernon Supp. 2007) (establishing
current U.S. congressional districts for Texas, as drawn by legislature in 2003);
Texas Redistricting, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/redist.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2009) (providing information about redistricting activities relating to: Texas
legislature's areas of responsibility, process and legal requirements, support services provided by Texas Legislative Council, and districts resulting from process);
see also Fair Vote, Texas Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=333
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Texas).
94. See UTAH CONST. art. IX, § 1 (authorizing Utah legislature to create U.S.
congressional districts); Utah State Legislature-2001 Meetings-Redistricting
Committee, http://www.le.state.ut.us/Inteim/2001/html/2001sperdt.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing information about Utah's Redistricting Committee's membership and schedule); see also Fair Vote, Utah Redistricting 2000, http:/
/www.fairvote.org/?page=334 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting
information for Utah).
95. See VA. CONsT. art. II, § 6 (establishing authority in Virginia General Assembly to draw U.S. congressional districts that are to be contiguous, compact, and
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and Wyoming (inapplicable to U.S. congressional district, which is at
large) .96
10. Category 10: States subjecting legislative redistricting authority to
gubernatorial veto.
Category 10 states vest total authority for redistricting in the legislature. The legislature's decision is, however, subject to gubernatorial veto.
States falling into Category 10 are Arkansas (as to U.S. congressional districts), 9 7 Colorado (as to U.S. congressional districts), 98 Massachusetts,9 9
10 1
Nebraska,10 2
Maryland,1 00 Missouri (as to U.S. congressional districts),
10 3
Ohio (as to U.S. congressional districts),
Oklahoma (as to U.S. congresas equal in population as practical, and providing that legislature has authority to
redraw districts after each forthcoming federal census); see also Virginia Division of
Legislative Services, Redistricting Virginia, http://dlsgis.state.va.us/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Commonwealth of
Virginia).
96. See Wvo. CONST. art. III, § 48 (granting Wyoming legislature authority to
divide states into U.S. congressional districts in event that federal census entitles
Wyoming to more than one U.S. congressional seat); see also Outline of Redistricting Information, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/leg2/redistrict/generalinfo.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing general redistricting information for Wyoming).
97. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2-101 to -105 (Supp. 2005) (establishing current
U.S. congressional districts for Arkansas); see also Fair Vote, Arkansas Redistricting
2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=293 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing
redistricting information for Arkansas).
98. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44 (granting Colorado General Assembly control over establishment of U.S. congressional districts); see also Colorado Legislative
Counsel, Constitutional Provisions Controlling Reapportionment/Redistricting,
http://www.state.co.us/gov.dir/leg dir/lcsstaff/REAP/Consitution.htm#State
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing state constitutional provisions controlling
reapportionment and redistricting for Colorado).
99. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 57, § 1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for Commonwealth of Massachusetts); see also Fair
Vote, Massachusetts Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=311 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Commonwealth of
Massachusetts).
100. See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw § 8-701 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003) (establishing authority of Maryland legislature to create U.S. congressional districts for
Maryland); Fair Vote, Maryland Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/
?page=310 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Maryland); see also Maryland General Assembly, Redistricting and Reapportionment,
http://redistricting.state.md.us/maryland/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing
redistricting and reapportionment information for Maryland).
101. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 128.346 (2007) (establishing authority of Missouri
legislature to create U.S. congressional districts); see also Fair Vote, Missouri Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=315 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Missouri).
102. See NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-504 (LexisNexis 2005) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for Nebraska); see also Fair Vote, Nebraska Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=317 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
(providing redistricting information for Nebraska).
103. See OHio CONST., § 11.01, availableat http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/
constitution.cfm?Part= 1 &Section=01 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redis-
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0
0 5
Rhode Island,1
sional districts) ,104 Pennsylvania,1
10 9
10 8
Virginia.
and West
Wisconsin,

6

10 7
South Carolina,

C. The "Before and After" Test: Did Adoption of Independent Redistricting
Change the Voting Behavior of Those States' CongressionalRepresentatives?
The fact that different systems for redistricting exist, and that they
provide something of a range of politicization in redistricting, serendipitously creates a state-by-state laboratory for testing the effects of different
redistricting processes on the broader political process. In this light, the
particular question posed can be conceptualized as whether the relatively
depoliticized redistricting systems reduce partisanship in subsequent congressional voting behavior by the representatives elected to the districts
drawn with relatively less concern for partisan political party opportunism,
compared to other districts. One test of this potential effect, explored in
this Article, compares the degree of partisanship shown in the voting
records of a state's congressional delegation before implementation of a
relatively independent redistricting system, with the degree of partisanship
shown in the voting records of the same state's congressional delegation
after a state employs a relatively independent redistricting system to redraw
congressional district boundaries.
tricting information for Ohio); OHiO REv.

CODE ANN.

§ 3521.01 (LexisNexis Supp.

2007) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for Ohio).
104. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 14, § 5.2 (2002) (establishing current U.S. congressional districts for Oklahoma); see also Fair Vote, Oklahoma Redistricting 2000,
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=326 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Oklahoma).
105. See 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3595.301 (West 2007) (establishing current
U.S. congressional districts for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania); see also Fair Vote,
Pennsylvania Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=328 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania).
106. See R.I. GEN. Laws § 174-1 (2003) (establishing authority of Rhode Island legislature to draw U.S. congressional districts for Rhode Island); see also Fair
Vote, Rhode Island Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=329 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Rhode Island).
107. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-40 (Supp. 2006) (establishing current U.S.
congressional districts for South Carolina); see also South Carolina Legislature Online, South Carolina Redistricting 2001, http://www.scstatehouse.net/html-pages/
redistl.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for
South Carolina).
108. See Wis. STAT. § 3.001 (2006) (establishing authority of Wisconsin legislature to draw U.S. congressional districts for Wisconsin); see also Wisconsin State
Legislature, Legislative Redistricting, http://www.legis.state.wi.us/ltsb/redistricting/stateofwisconsin.profile.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for Wisconsin).
109. SeeW. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 4 (establishing authority of West Virginia legislature to draw contiguous, compact U.S. congressional districts of as equal population as practicable); see also Fair Vote, West Virginia Redistricting 2000, http://
www.fairvote.org/?page=338 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing redistricting information for West Virginia).
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With this test in mind, the authors first identify which redistricting
processes were relatively independent, and second, which of those systems
were used by states to redraw congressional district lines for the first time
after the 2000 census-typically at the end of 2002. Recognizing some
degree of uncertainty about the relative degrees of independence of the
various forms of redistricting commissions and systems, the authors accepted any examples from the first eight categories of redistricting commissions in the Mercer Study as qualifying as "relatively independent"
forms of redistricting systems. The authors further winnowed the target
group to those states with relatively independent redistricting systems that
were invoked for the first time in the 2002 redistricting cycle to redraw
congressional districts in their states. Under these two criteria for testing,
the following five states were selected for this study: Alabama, Arizona,
Connecticut, Idaho, and Maine. In other words, the authors believe that
those five states constitute the entire universe of states that redistricted
their congressional districts for the first time after the 2000 census (completed near the end of 2002), using a relatively independent form of redistricting commission or system (namely, any system identified in categories
one through eight of the Mercer Study of Redistricting Systems).

III.

MEASURING CHANGES IN PARTISANSHIP IN CONGRESSIONAL
VOTING BEHAVIOR

Next, the authors of this Article addressed another empirical challenge: identifying a particular measure of general partisanship in legislative voting behavior, so as to gauge whether a change to a more
independent redistricting system might have some statistically observable
effect on the degree of perceived partisanship in the aggregate of each
relevant state's congressional representatives' voting records. Votes by any
legislative representative reflect many factors. Thus, the very notion of
characterizing any particular vote as categorically partisan, or any particular representative on any particular vote as excessively partisan, is problematic. Political science scholars and academicians pursued analyses of roll
call voting for many years, demonstrating considerable sophistication especially on questions involving the extent of party influence over different
types of votes." I0
110. See, e.g., William H. Riker, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986);
Gary W. Cox & Eric Magar, How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?,
93 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 299 (1999); Gregory L. Hager &Jeffrey C. Talbert, Look for the

Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U.S. House, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75 (2000);
Keith Krehbiel, Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship,44 AM. J. POL. Scl. 212
(2000); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, D-NOMINATE After 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political-EconomicHistory of Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 5 (2001);James M. SnyderJr. & Tim Groseclose, EstimatingParty Influence
on Roll-Call Voting, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 193 (2000); James M. Snyder, Jr. & Tim
Groseclose, Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients Versus
Classification Success, 95 AM. POL. Sci. Rv. 689 (2001).
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The authors of this Article, however, are particularly interested in the
perception of partisanship overall, as viewed not by academicians that
gauge parties' power or other forces that influence voting behavior, but
rather by the most knowledgeable political participants: the very partisans
who craft the questions to be voted upon and count the subsequent
votes. I I Since the 1980s, the most widely acclaimed source of such data
has indisputably been the NationalJournal,whose board of experts devised
measures of the degrees to which particular congressional votes conform
to "conservative" or "liberal" characterizations.' 12 Washington onlookers
111. See generally Eilperin, supra note 3 (writing on partisanship in U.S. House
of Representative).
112. The NationalJournalexplained the methodology used in generating the
ratings:
The ratings system was first devised in 1981 under the direction of William Schneider, a political analyst and commentator, and a contributing
editor to NationalJournal,who continues to guide the calculation process.
Data processing and statistical analysis were performed by Information
Technology Services of the Brookings Institution.
The votes in each issue area were subjected to a principal-components analysis, a statistical procedure designed to determine the degree
to which each vote resembled other votes in the same category (the same
members tending to vote together). Ten of the 187 votes (two in the Senate and eight in the House) were dropped from the analysis because they
were statistically unrelated to others in the same issue area. These typically were votes that reflected regional and special-interest concerns,
rather than general ideology.
The analysis also revealed which yea votes correlated with which nay
votes within each issue area (members voting yea on certain issues tended
to vote nay on others). The yea and nay positions on each roll call were
then identified as conservative or liberal.
Each roll-call vote was assigned a weight from 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest), based on the degree to which it correlated with other votes in the
same issue area. A higher weight means that a vote was more strongly
correlated with other votes and was therefore a better test of economic,
social, or foreign-policy ideology. The votes in each issue area were combined in an index (liberal or conservative votes as a percentage of total
votes cast, with each vote weighted 1, 2, or 3).
Absences and abstentions were not counted; instead, the percentage base
was adjusted to compensate for missed roll calls. A member who missed
more than half of the votes in any issue category was scored as 'missing' in
that category (shown as an asterisk [*] in the vote-rating tables).
Members were then ranked from the most liberal to the most conservative in each issue area. These rankings were used to assign liberal
and conservative percentile ratings to all members of Congress.
The liberal percentile score means that the member voted more liberal than that percentage of his or her colleagues in that issue area in
2006. The conservative figure means that the member voted more conservative than that percentage of his or her colleagues.
For example, a House member in the 30th percentile of liberals and
the 60th percentile of conservatives on economic issues voted more liberal than 30 percent of the House and more conservative than 60 percent
of the House on those issues, and was tied with the remaining 10 percent.
The scores do not mean that the member voted liberal 30 percent of the
time and voted conservative 60 percent of the time.
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use the NationalJournalsannual aggregation of such data-more than 100

votes a year are used for the analysis-as the best available independent
approximation of where on the political spectrum an individual congressional representative lies for the purposes of partisan labeling." 1 3 Due to

the authors' concern with the interplay, if any, between redistricting and
the perception of partisanship, it seems appropriate to credit the perceptions of those who are most intimately involved in the relevant political
process. Thus, the NationalJournal approach to gauging partisanship in
roll call voting is more appropriate than having the academic authors of
this Article choose from a number of different academic approaches to
analyzing the "partisanship" (however academically defined) evidenced in
roll-call voting. Indeed, none of the academic approaches appear to be
extensively relied upon by the actual participants in the political processes,
and each academic approach seems to have been designed for more specialized purposes than those at stake in this Article.
As a result, the authors aggregated National JournalVote Ratings for
all the representatives in each of the five surveyed states for the periods of
1996-2002, before a redistricting in each state, and from 2003-2006, after a
redistricting in each state using a relatively more independent form of redistricting system.
A. Our Statistical Analysis of Whether the Introduction of Independent
Redistricting Reduced Partisanshipin Voting by District Representatives

First, we generated a partisan variable that is the absolute difference
between the National Journals "Liberal Score" (CLS) and "Conservative
Score" (CCS) for each of the five states' aggregated congressional delega-

tions, both before and after independent redistricting took effect in those
states at the end of 2002. Before we could determine whether the average
Percentile scores can range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of
100. Some members, however, voted either consistently liberal or consistently conservative on every roll call. As a result, there are ties at both the
liberal and the conservative ends of each scale. For that reason, the maximum percentiles are usually less than 100.
Members also receive a composite liberal score and a composite conservative score, each of which is an average of their five issue-based scores.
Members who missed more than half of the votes in any of the three issue
categories do not receive a composite score (shown as an asterisk [*] in
the vote-rating tables).
To determine a member's composite liberal score, for example, first
add the liberal scores in all three issue areas. Next, in each issue area,
calculate 100 minus the member's conservative score and add the three

results together. The two figures are then combined and divided by 6
(the number of individual scores).
Methodology: How the 2007 Voting Ratings Are Calculated,NAT'LJ., Mar. 7, 2008, avail-

able at http://nationaljournal.com/voteratings/methodology.htm. Ratings from
earlier years are available by arrangement with the NationalJournal, which maintains a proprietary interest in the information.
113. See Telephone Interview with Tom Bonier, Political Analyst, Nat'l Comm.
for an Effective Cong. (Oct. 9, 2007) (on file with author).
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level of partisanship fell after the redistricting at the end of 2002 using a
relatively independent form of redistricting, and thus, whether the mean
value of our partisan variable had fallen, we had to determine if the variance, and therefore, the standard deviation before the redistricting, both
within a state and across all states, was significantly different from the variance after redistricting. The standard deviation ratio tests are shown in
Table 1 below. Our null hypotheses are that the pre- and post-redistricting
standard deviations are the same and, thus, the ratio of variances is one.
The alternative hypotheses are that the pre- and post-redistricting variances are different and, thus, statistically significantly different from one.
Table 1 reports the standard deviation ratio test results for the overall sample, including for all five states as well as for each individual state.
TABLE 1: PARTISANSHIP STANDARD DEVIATION RATIO TESTS

Years

Overall

State Representative Caucus

State
Averages Alabama
Mean Overall
Std. Dev. Overall

1997-2006
1997-2006

40.98
14.77

53.52
25.51

Arizona
56.37
26.94

Connecticut
33.75
28.90

Idaho
45.08
18.64

Maine
59.61
14.87

Mean Preredistricting
Std. Dev. Preredistricting

1997-2002

45.67

56.43

57.48

34.87

54.83

65.65

1997-2002

14.34

25.42

24.57

26.33

15.04

12.76

Mean Postredistricting
Std. Dev. Postredistricting

2003-2006

33.93

49.15

55.12

31.74

30.45

50.55

2003-2006

12.71

25.47

29.72

33.69

13.40

13.72

1.27
29, 19

1.00
41, 27

0.68
35, 31

0.61
35, 19

1.26
11, 7

0.86
11, 7

0.59

0.97

0.28

0.20

0.78

0.80

Standard Deviation
Ratio Test
Ho: ratio = 1

f-value
Degrees of Freedom
Ha: ratio -

1

2*Pr(F > f) =
* Significant at alpha = .05
** Significant at alpha = .01

Looking at the overall average level of partisanship in the states, we
see that the average level of partisanship appears lower but statistically indistinguishable after redistricting for the particular states of Alabama, Arizona, and Connecticut. Over the same period, however, we see a
statistically significant reduction in partisanship in Idaho and Maine, and
most significantly, in the aggregated data for all five states surveyed. In
other words, we can say at the 99 percent confidence level that the degree
of partisanship in voting behavior of representatives comprising the pool
of five states changed after the introduction in those states of relatively independent redistricting after about late 2002, and furthermore, that the
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TABLE 2: PARTISANSHIP MEANS TESTS

State Representative Caucus
Overall
State
Averages Alabama Arizona Connecticut Idaho
45.08
33.75
56.37
40.98
53.52
1997-2006
18.64
28.90
25.51
26.94
19972006
14.77

Maine

Years

Mean Overall
Std. Dev. Overall

59.61
14.87

Mean Preredistricting
Std. Dev. Preredistricting

1997-2002

45.67

56.43

57.48

34.87

54.83

65.65

1997-2002

14.34

25.42

24.57

26.33

15.04

12.76

Mean Postredistricting
Std. Dev. Postredistricting

2003-2006

33.93

49.15

55.12

31.74

30.45

50.55

2003-2006

12.71

25.47

29.72

33.69

13.40

13.72

2.96
48.00

1.17
68.00

0.36
66.00

0.39
54.00

3.70
18.00

2.52
18.00

0.00**

0.24

0.72

0.70

0.00*

0.02**

0.00**

0.12

0.36

0.35

0.00*

0.01**

Mean (1997-2002) Mean (2003-2006)

Ho: = 0
t-value
Degrees of Freedom
0

Ha: -

Pr(ITI >

It)

Ha: > 0
Pr(T > t) =

Significant at alpha = .05
** Significant at alpha = .01
*

degree of partisanship in the aggregate meaningfully declined after the introduction of relatively independent redistricting after late 2002.

B.

Were National Trends or Other Key Variables Skewing the Five-State Data?
At least three alternative hypotheses would also yield differences in

the mean levels of partisanship over time in these selected states. First,
there may have been a national trend due to some exogenous factor that
caused all states, not just those states newly undergoing independent redistricting, to experience a reduction in the level of partisanship. Second,
these states may have unique characteristics, not accounted for in the
above means tests, that explain why these five states in particular experienced both depoliticized redistricting and declining levels of partisanship. Third, it is possible that the unique party affiliations of the
representatives in these five states may explain their levels of partisanship.
In other words, other states with party representation patterns similar to
the patterns present in these five states may have experienced a similar
reduction in the level of partisanship because of the pattern of party affiliation and not because of independent redistricting.
In order to address these alternative hypotheses as to why differences
in the level of partisanship may have occurred, we generated our measure
of partisanship using the NationalJournal's Vote Ratings for all House
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members in 1998 and 2006, times in non-presidential years both before
and after the five-state group instituted independent redistricting. Initially, we calculated the average level of partisanship by each state's caucus.
We then regressed the following equation:
partisanshipj.,= a + f, (independent - redistrictingj, )+ fl 2(year = 2006)+ y(statei)+ ej.,
(Eq. 1)
for each state j in year t. Independent redistricting is an indicator variable
that is one if the election takes place after a new independent redistricting
policy was instituted, year is an indicator variable for observations during
the 2006 election, and state is the vector of dummies for each state. Including the year indicator variable estimates the national trend in partisanship
across all caucuses. The state indicator variable accounts for any unique
state characteristics that may affect the level of partisanship by each state
caucus.
The results are shown in Table 3, Estimate 3, below. Accounting for
both differences across states and the possibility of a national trend in partisanship, a state that independently redistricted in 2002 witnessed a 10
percentage point decline in the average level of partisanship of its state
caucus. Unfortunately, the estimated coefficient is imprecisely estimated,
TABLE

3:

OVERALL STATE PARTISANSHIP

Post Independent Redistricting

Estimate 1
2.587
[0.410]

Year 2006 dummy

Constant

30.541
[11.008]***
No
100
0.001

Estimate 2
4.936
[0.746]
-4.463
[1.541]
32.655
[10.260]***
No
100
0.011

State Dummies
Observations
R-squared
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Estimate 3
-10.054
[1.277]
-2.964

[0.706]
38.882
[18.529]***
Yes
100
0.802

with an estimate significantly different from zero just fractionally shy of a
90 percent confidence interval (89.3 percent). Although it does appear
that the average level of partisanship by state caucuses nationwide was
marginally lower in 2006 than in 1998, due to the negative coefficient estimated on the year indicator variable, the shift is not statistically significant.
This result, however, may just be an artifact of party affiliation or the
construction of the average. Furthermore, averaging across the entire caucus does not capture how individual representatives may alter their voting
patterns given how their constituents are grouped. In order to address
such possibilities, we returned to the voting records of all 435 individual
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representatives to determine if individual representatives within a state
vote with less partisanship after independent redistricting. We then regressed the following:
partisanship,.J' =
a + fi, (independent-redistricting j,)+ 2 (year = 2006)+ y(state,)+ .(party, 1 ,)+ e,

,

(Eq.2)
where i, j, t is the representative in district i, in state j, during year t. Independent redistrictingis an indicator variable that is one if the individual representative's election takes place after a new independent redistricting
policy was instituted, year is an indicator variable for observations during
the 2006 election, state is the vector of dummies for each state, and party is
an indicator variable representing the representatives party affiliation. We
are again accounting for any national trend in partisanship by using the
variable year and state characteristics that may affect the level of partisanship through the use of the state indicator variable. Furthermore, by including party affiliation, we are now holding constant the effect party
affiliation may have on the level of partisanship.
The results, shown in Table 4, are more conclusive as seen in Estimate
4.114 Holding constant state characteristics and a representative's party
TABLE

4:

INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVE PARTISANSHIP

Estimate 1 Estimate 2
Post Independent Redistricting -5.66
-5.944
Year 2006 dummy
Constant

Estimate 3 Estimate 4
-12.928
-12.479
[1.772]*
[1.641]
[3.543]***
[3.321]***
0.551
0.687
0.68
[0.335]
[0.416]
[0.415]
49.585
49.319
37.056
40.637
[26.040]*** [29.687]*** [44.914]*** [8.500]***
Yes
Yes
Yes
861
861
861
861
0.001
0.002
0.148
0.152

State Dummies
Party Membership Dummy
Observations
R-squared
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

affiliation while accounting for any possible national trend in partisanship,
a representative from a state that newly, independently redistricted in

2002 voted with less partisanship. The estimated coefficient reports a 12.5
114. With 435 districts represented in 1998 and 2006, the total number of
observations should sum to 870. For 1998, however, the NationalJournaldoes not
report a voting score for Georgia district six, New Mexico district one, and Texas
district twenty. For 2006, the NationalJournaldoes not report a voting score for
California district fifty, Florida district eleven, Illinois districts fourteen and seventeen, New Jersey district thirteen, and Texas district twenty-two.
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percentage point reduction and is significant at the 99 percent confidence
interval or alpha equal 0.01.
In short, we have taken some steps to consider whether other factors
may be affecting the primary results explored in this Article. Though we
cannot, and do not, say that other factors have no bearing on partisanship
in voting by congressional representatives, we can say that some of the
most likely extrinsic factors do not appear to be overwhelming the central
observation of this Article: that the introduction of independent redistricting reduces perceived partisanship in the voting records of congressional
representatives from those states. After accounting for (1) a possible national trend, (2) individual differences between the studied states and all
other states, and (3) the particular pattern of party affiliation in the five
states compared with other states, we still observe a statistically significant
reduction in partisanship among states newly introducing depoliticized
systems for redistricting.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

We examined those five states that redistricted for the first time at
about the end of 2002 using relatively politically independent redistricting
systems. We conclude that there is statistically significant evidence of a
reduction in the most popular conventional measure of perceived partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional representatives .115 Based
on this finding, we hypothesize, but have not proven, the converse: that
there is some statistically significant causal connection between relatively
politicized forms of redistricting and partisanship perceived in the subsequent voting behavior of congressional representatives elected from those
districts.
The study underlying this Article does not prove why the introduction
of independent redistricting reduces congressional partisanship, a question warranting more study. It seems plausible, however, that the partisanship reduction results from a reduction in the number of districts packed
with unusual concentrations of voters from one or another party. Redistricting that results in "de-packing" would result in the affected representatives being answerable to a more mixed electorate, which in turn would
encourage the affected representatives to consider a broader array of interests, in effect becoming more centrist.
To check this hypothesis in the future, one might expect to find that
states having a recent history of bipartisan gerrymandering would show
greater reductions in partisanship after the introduction of independent
redistricting than states having a recent history of partisan gerrymandering, because partisan gerrymandering is associated with only partial pack115. The conventional measure of perceived partisanship is the reduction in
the variance between the NationalJournalVote Ratings's liberal and conservative
voting scores for individual legislators when that data is aggregated by relevant
state.
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ing of districts, while bipartisan gerrymandering results in more uniformly
packed districts. Another immediate need for further study involves how
to reconcile the tentative result of this Article, which concludes that independent redistricting reduces perceived partisanship, with the tentative result of the draft paper by Professors McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, which
1 16
concludes that party affiliation plays a dominant role in partisanship.
Although we presented statistically significant evidence about the ability of independent systems for redistricting to reduce the conventional appearance of partisanship in congressional voting behavior, we make no
claim that there is an exclusive or primary relationship between relatively
politicized forms of redistricting and excessive partisanship by affected
congressional representatives. Indeed, the authors readily concede that
there likely are many other forces at work in fostering an environment
conducive to political partisanship, and conversely, in potentially undermining the conditions conducive to political partisanship. We would not
be surprised, for instance, if further research shows that individual repre116. See McCarty et al., supra note 24 (dismissing causal link between Congressional polarization and partisan gerrymandering). Complementary readings of
the two papers seem possible, although it is also possible that their respective conclusions conflict. The McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal paper concludes that party
identification is strongly aligned with partisanship of voting record, and that "the
centers of the two major parties have drifted further apart" for reasons that have
little to do with redistricting.
Even if true across all congressional districts, such a conclusion would not
necessarily mean that redistricting does not have a contributing effect on polarization. Moreover, it seems that the McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal paper focuses in
significant part on estimates about a factually small sample of moderate districts
that exhibit so-called "intra-district divergence" and that do not exhibit sorting
effects, while under-examining the phenomena of districts exhibiting sorting effects (i.e., conservative constituencies electing Republicans who vote conservatively, and liberal constituencies electing Democrats who vote liberally). If so, their
paper may structurally avoid considerations of possible evidence of excessive partisanship in the increasingly "strong" safe-seat districts that show sorting effects.
There is some reason to suspect that the voting records of representatives
from districts with strong majorities favoring the representatives' own parties may
skew in even more of a partisan direction than the respective constituencies' presidential voting performance might predict, and hence be evidence of excessive partisanship by the representatives (rather than just the normal degree of partisanship
that could be expected by representatives merely attempting to mirror the degree
of partisanship exhibited by the underlying constituent base). Indeed, the kind of
polarization analyzed in the McCarty paper may be a different kind of polarization
than what is conceptualized in this paper. McCarty et al. state, "Some of the increase in polarization is due to an increase in the congruence between a district's
characteristics and the party of its representative. Republicans are more likely to
represent conservative districts and Democrats are more likely to represent liberal
ones." The authors of this Article would not describe congruence between a constituency's presidential voting performance and its representative's voting record
as exemplifying excessive partisanship, or polarization. In any event, McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal do concede that the elimination of districting altogether in
favor of statewide elections would "roll polarization back to the level of the mid1990s." Insofar as our paper is only making a claim that independent redistricting
can cause marginal reductions in partisanship, the basic claims may still be practically reconcilable.
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sentatives may exhibit higher degrees of perceived partisanship in voting
to the extent those representatives are subjected to party discipline and/or
counted in party leadership positions. Another potential set of issues include the effects of tenure, particular party affiliation, race, age, and gender on partisanship in voting. A different perspective might be gleaned
from analyzing how constituent demographics, constituent party affiliations, and constituent voting patterns in other settings may have some
bearing on partisanship in a congressional representative's voting
behavior.
Of course, the authors make no claim that there is any exclusive or
primary causal relationship between the use of independent redistricting
systems and reductions in the partisanship shown in the voting behavior of
congressional representatives elected from those districts. Presumably,
partisanship may be reduced in a number of ways, only one of which may
involve adoption of relatively depoliticized systems for redistricting. Nonetheless, the authors note that former Representative Hamilton expressed
hope in adjusting the states' systems for redistricting if such adjustments
would produce even a "little" change in overall congressional partisanship.' 17 Therefore, from the vantage point of Representative Hamilton,
and more generally as a matter of scholarly interest about the potential
interconnectedness of partisanship in the redistricting process and other
incidences of partisanship in American political life, our limited findings
are of some interest.
As to independent redistricting commissions and related systems for
depoliticizing redistricting, it will be useful to confirm through other tests
whether they do reduce voting partisanship and whether they will continue to have such effects after an initial switch. Moreover, especially for
states considering adopting new forms of independent redistricting systems, as well as for states contemplating changes to existing systems, it
would be useful to know whether particular types of relatively depoliticized
redistricting systems are more effective than others at reducing partisanship overall. It will be interesting to sift through the effects of the next
round of redistricting in the continuing reapportionment revolution,
comparing and contrasting the experience of state caucuses that are selected through different techniques. Meanwhile, more empirical and analytical work still can be done on the historical record that already exists, as
we continue to seek out clues into how and whether different types of
redistricting decisions affect the composition of legislative bodies and the
subsequent behavior of legislators.
Even without changes in the laws governing redistricting, however,
there is reason to suspect that partisanship in redistricting may change on
its own. It will be intriguing to gauge, for instance, the extent to which
117. See Hamilton,
partisanship).

supra note 5 (seeking to reduce congressional
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Justice O'Connor was correct in Davis v. Bandemer 18 to observe that partisanship in redistricting is self-regulating, that is, that parties will not
overdo it without suffering painful negative consequences. 1 19 The 2006
congressional election reversal for the Republicans, in which more seats
proved to be at play than had previously been predicted by many onlookers, underlines the latent threat of democratic discipline. 120 With that experience relatively fresh at hand, one could imagine the parties taking
somewhat different approaches to redistricting after the 2010 census, even
without regulatory interventions to depoliticize the process as a formal
matter.
Finally, the authors recognize more fundamentally that there may be
valid reason to question the wholesale normative revulsion to the concept
of partisanship, whether in the particular case of redistricting or in the
general case of congressional voting patterns. Is partisanship wholly normatively undesirable, or is it defensible to the extent that it helps sharpen
choices and issues, provides a way for a potential third party to undermine
the political duopoly, facilitates the expression of what a majority of voters
in a district wishes to express about issues on the political agenda, or expresses absolute, uncompromising distinctions between competing principles? We envision a more nuanced approach to partisanship than has so
far accompanied the literature on the subject.
118. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
119. See id. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing reasons partisan gerrymandering is likely "self-limiting enterprise").
120. On a micro-political level, one might loosely view Tom DeLay's downfall
as a form of discipline for his prominent role in the national spectacle of the middecennial 2003 Texas redistricting. See, e.g., Bickerstaff, supra note 38 (relating
support of partisan redistricting to demise of Congressman Delay's career). Elbridge Gerry, gerrymandering's namesake, himself surrendered the governorship
of Massachusetts in an electoral loss the year following his oversight of the publicly
ridiculed, and now-classic, example of gerrymandering.
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